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The European Commission’s strategy for the Rule of Law was published just a few
weeks after the CJEU’s seminal judgment in Commission v. Poland. Consequently,
the time of its publication coincided with the judicial confirmation of the sad reality
that the departure from the liberal democracy standards in both Hungary and Poland
cannot be define as moderate anymore and that the judicial independence in both
countries is at stake.
Is a soft law instrument the right object of assessment in a situation where most
commentators on the ongoing rule of law crisis summarise previous EU actions
with the statement: too late, too long, too mild? This piece offers a look at the July
blueprint for action as a political declaration which provides important general
statements regarding the concept of the rule of law within the EU legal system
in times of democratic backsliding in Member States. Starting with a discussion
about the scope of the rule of law principle in the EU and an argument against its
enforcement, this blog post will analyse the potential of the current rule of law crisis
to mark a unique historical change in the European constitutionalism, both on the EU
and national level.
The Rule of Law as an Essentially Contested
Concept? The European Commission in search for
core elements.
In 2002 Jeremy Waldron published the essay with the provocative title: “Is the Rule
of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (In Florida)?” (pp. 137-164) which loosely
refers to another academic piece published in 1956 by the Scottish philosopher
Walter Bryce Gallie.1)W. B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, Proceedings
of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 56 (1955 – 1956), pp. 167-198. For
Waldron, the turmoil surrounding the counting and recounting of votes in the State
of Florida in the 2000 U.S. presidential election served as an illustration of ambiguity
and to some extent overuse of the Rule-of-Law card which has been played by the
parties whenever it suited (138). The essay presents a splendid overview of various
jurisprudential interpretations of the rule of law as a political ideal. The multiplicity
of theoretical approaches to the rule of law, no matter how fascinating for legal
philosophers is, nevertheless, a pitfall for any political body faced with the task of
formulating an overall strategy for dealing with obvious and systemic rule of law
violations.
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The Commission’s statement presented in the first paragraph of the July blueprint for
action demonstrates awareness of this problem. The Commission holds that:
“the rule of law is a well-established principle, well-defined in its core meaning.
This core meaning, in spite of the different national identities and legal systems and
traditions that the Union is bound to respect, is the same in all Member States.(…)
Under the rule of law, all public powers always act within the constraints set out by
law, in accordance with the values of democracy and fundamental rights, and under
the control of independent and impartial courts.”
Such an approach to the essence of the rule of law draws parallels between
the Commission and the work of Philip Selznick and Martin Krygier who see
the reduction of the arbitrary use of power as the central value and point to the
importance of a contextual approach to realising that value: reducing arbitrariness
may require very different specific measures from one society to another.2)Cf.
E. Mak, S. Taekema, The European Union’s Rule of Law Agenda: Identifying Its
Core and Contextualizing Its Application, Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 2016,
Vol. 8, p. 27. While recognising current challenges to the rule of law in Member
States, the emphasis has been put on recent cases with a resonance at the EU level
which have centred on the independence of the judicial process. Other examples
mentioned in the blueprint for action have concerned weakened constitutional courts,
an increasing use of executive ordinances, repeated attacks from one branch of the
state on another, or more widely, high-level corruption, abuse of office and attempts
to diminish pluralism and weaken essential watchdogs such as civil society and
independent media.
The central place of judicial independence in the rule of law concept presented
by the Commission is not surprising. The EU legal system works through national
courts that directly apply EU law. The threat to the independence of national courts
calls into question the effectiveness of the entire EU law system. However, the
preliminary ruling procedure serves as an effective tool for referring systemic
questions regarding rule of law to the CJEU. The recent rulings of the European
Court of Justice in Case C-64/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses
v. Tribunal de Contas, case C# 216/18 PPU, LM,  case C-619/18, Commission v.
Poland, and case C#192/18, Commission v. Poland prove that effective judicial
protection by independent courts (Art. 19 (1) TEU) is a specific expression of the rule
of law principle and that the independence of national courts is essential to ensure
such judicial protection (see also EU Comm, Strengthening the rule of law within
the Union – A blueprint for action). Although the organisation of the national judicial
system falls within the jurisdiction of the Member States, they must comply with EU
law obligations when exercising that competence, and therefore this may be subject
to review by the Court of Justice.
Nevertheless, the emphasis on the material elements of the rule of law – such
as the independent judiciary – does not go hand in hand with indications of the
root causes of rule of law violations often associated with non-compliance with
formal standards of the rule of law, above others the eight desiderata of Lon Fuller’s
“internal morality of law”. According to Fuller, laws should be (1) general, (2) publicly
- 2 -
promulgated, (3) prospective, (4) intelligible, (5) consistent, (6) practicable, (7) not
too frequently changeable, and (8) actually congruent with the behaviour of the
officials of a regime.3)L. L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, Revised Edition, New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1969, p. 39. In particular, the case of Poland proves that the
instrumental changes in the regulations of parliamentary chambers, express pace
of the legislative procedure, the lack of adequate (and sometimes any) vacatio legis
and statutory amendments following one after another enabled the PiS government
to introduce reforms violating substantial elements of the rule of law. Therefore, the
Commission’s search for the core elements of the European rule of law concept
should take into account to a greater extent the formal aspect of the rule of law which
has been left in the background of the strategy. The infringement of the basic law-
making principles is the underlying cause for the present challenges to the rule of
law in EU.
About Constitutional Identity, Common
Constitutional Values and the Fetishisation of
Political Constitutionalism
Martin Krygier pointed out that “rulers do many bad things, often parading them
under the mantle of the rule of law”. This apt observation acquires unique relevance
in the context of the Commission’s blueprint for action aimed at preventing rule of
law violations. Recent academic insights point to the construction of an argument
around constitutional identity as one of the jeopardies to effectively counteract the
further erosion of the rule of law in Member States. According to this position, with
the emergence and ongoing consolidation of competitive authoritarian regimes
especially in Hungary and Poland, these governments have started to use the idea
of a constitutional identity to justify their dismantlement of checks on their power
and to shield themselves against potential EU interventions. In my opinion, this
observation is only accurate regarding the abuse of constitutional identity as an
argument against the rule of law and not about constitutional identity itself. Until the
illiberal government violating the rule of law does not obtain a constitutional majority
(as happened in Hungary), it is bound by binding constitutional norms. This means
that constitutional identity can also be used as an important argument in the debate
on the essence of the European concept of the rule of law. The constitutional identity
of Member States, in addition to the individualising elements characteristic for this
idea, turns out to contain elements of a  more universal dimension. One of them
is the rule of law. Therefore, the constitutional identity of a Member State has the
salient potential for the pluralistic legitimisation of the enforcement of the strong
union of values. This, however, requires noticing and emphasising the similarities
between the universal elements of Member States’ constitutional identities (Art. 4 (2)
TEU), common constitutional traditions (Art. 6 (3) TEU) and  six foundational values
of the EU (Art. 2 TEU).
The real threat to the rule of law in the EU is fetishisation and instrumentalisation of
political constitutionalism. While the current theoretical trend to emphasise the dual
nature of the constitution (both legal and political) enables constitutional scholars
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to pay attention to the long forgotten (or purposely hidden) political foundations
of constitutionalism,  it becomes a dangerous tool in the hands of politicians
striving for authoritarian power. The contemporary populism, neo-authoritarianism,
democratic backsliding and retrogression of liberal constitutionalism has emerged
in reprisal of the domination of the legal and judicial elites. The pendulum which
had leaned too much towards legal constitutionalism, bounced back to the side
of political constitutionalism. Illiberal governments instrumentally use this swing
effect, transforming the idea of political constitutionalism into de facto abusive
constitutionalism or statutory anti-constitutionalism.
Democratic backsliding as the new constitutional
momentum for the EU
According to Miguel Poiares Maduro, European constitutionalism promotes
inclusiveness in national democracies by requiring national political processes to
take into account out-of-state interests that may be affected by the deliberations
of those political processes. European constitutionalism can constitute a form of
self-imposed external constitutional discipline on national democracies. There are
many instances were domestic political malfunctions can be better corrected by
external constraints. These may force national political processes to rationalise
national policies that have, for example, become path-dependent or captured by
certain interests. In many such instances, EU law’s imposed discipline rationalises
and, often, reignites a more informed and genuinely open deliberation in the national
political process. Therefore, the current rule of law crisis has the potential to be
a watershed moment for European constitutionalism on both an EU and national
level. The analysis of the limits of the national constituent power in the context of
participation in the pluralist European constitutional order can help define European
constitutionalism and its constitutional essentials within a pluralist, overlapping
consensus. Unfortunately, the Commission does not seem to recognise this
potential. The July blueprint for action is just another piece of (very) soft law which
lacks a broader political vision and ignores the primary causes of the rule of law
violations.
The progressive erosion of the constitutional democracy in several EU Member
States sets ambitious tasks for the new Commission. It should go beyond the
previous strategy and propose solutions which will take into account the importance
of the current rule of law crisis for the future of European constitutionalism. Hopefully
the Commission will rise to the momentousness of this period.
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